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Methodological Considerations in Addressing the Issue of Forced Migrations, Lost Territories and the Related Politics of History: A Comparative Approach

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► To cite this version:

Anne Bazin, Catherine Perron. Methodological Considerations in Addressing the Issue of Forced Migrations, Lost Territories and the Related Politics of History: A Comparative Approach. Bazin, Anne; Perron, Catherine. How to address the loss? Forced migrations, lost territories and politics of history in Germany and Europe in the XXth century, Peter Lang, pp.11-36, 2018, 9782807605800. hal-03211907

HAL Id: hal-03211907

<https://hal.univ-lille.fr/hal-03211907v1>

Submitted on 10 Jun 2024

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Version auteure – pour le texte publié se reporter à

Anne Bazin, Catherine Perron, “Methodological Considerations in Addressing the Issue of forced Migrations, Lost Territories, and Related Politics of History. A Comparative Approach”, in Anne Bazin, Catherine Perron (eds.), *How to Address the Loss ? Forced Migrations, Lost Territories, and the Politics of History. A Comparative Approach in Europe and at its Margins in the XXth Century Europe*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2018. 234p.



Detail of a monument in memory of flight and expulsion - Burghaldenfriedhof, Sindelfingen, Germany

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Summary

The map of Europe has been redrawn several times during the XXth century, in peaceful or violent ways, and the shifting of borders has often been associated with forced migrations. But, despite the fact that this has been the fate of millions of Europeans, the memory of it has so far received little attention beyond national borders. This book examines how hosting states and societies, as well as groups that were forced to leave, deal with the memory of the loss in the long term. It explores the politics of history and the conflicting interpretations of the loss associated with forced migrations.

In a comparative and diachronic approach, the book depicts the interactions between the actors involved in the politics of history: their motivations, their resources and the public they seek to address. It looks at the different contexts in which these actors evolve and traces the changes of these politics in time and space. It shows how the memory of territorial loss associated with forced migrations interferes with the present and how it has evolved within

the political constraints of good neighborhood as well as of European and international standards that have emerged since the end of the cold war.

By confronting case studies in Europe and at its margins, the book questions the emergence of more inclusive collective memories and memory cultures. It is a significant contribution to a comparative approach on forced migrations and politics of history relating to loss.

How to Address the Loss?
**Forced Migrations, Lost Territories and the Politics of History in Germany, Europe and
at its Margins in the XXth Century.**

Anne BAZIN & Catherine PERRON (eds.)

EDITOR'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book originates in a conference entitled “Penser la perte / How to address the loss – towards a new approach to the politics of history in relation to lost territories and the forced transfers of populations in Europe and at its borders”, held at Sciences Po - CERI on 4 December 2015. Most of the papers published in the book were discussed during the conference.

We are thankful to the Centre d'Etudes Internationales (CERI) - Sciences Po Paris, to Sciences Po Lille, as well as to the Centre d'Etude des Mondes Russe, Caucasiens et Centre Européen (CERCEC)/EHESS, and to the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales (CERAPS-CNRS)/University of Lille for their financial support.

We also would like to express our gratitude to Malcom Green, Cynthia J. Johnson, Eunice Pelini Sanya, Roger Depledge and Charlotte Forfang, who helped translate and edit the texts in English.

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**Methodological Considerations in Addressing the Issue of forced Migrations,
Lost Territories, and Related Politics of History. A Comparative Approach.**

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**A striking experience in the XXth century but only a little place in European collective
memory**

The map of Europe has been redrawn many times during the XXth century because of several wars – two world wars and decolonization wars –, the end of the Cold war and the disintegration of the USSR. This has been done in both peaceful and violent ways. Addressing and managing territorial loss or territorial changes is thus a phenomenon that Europe is accustomed to. One might even add that very few countries have been spared such a challenge at one moment or another in their recent history. Shifting borders, however, is not limited to the reconfiguration of space. It also implies rethinking and redefining the relationship with the territory, with the nation and with the state itself. This is particularly true when territorial transformations are accompanied by forced migrations such as those we focus on in this book.

We use the term “forced migrations”¹ to refer to the “population transfers” primarily used in the Greek-Turkish case (see Bruneau and Copeaux in this book), the “exodus” of Italians from Istria and Dalmatia (see Gustavo Corni in this book), the “expulsion” of Jews from Islamic countries (see Baussant in this book), the “expulsion” of Germans from Eastern Europe (see Hahn and Hahn in this book), the Finns’ “flight” following the fate of the Karelians during the war (see Katajala and Liikanen in this book) and to the “repatriation” of Poles from *Kresy* (see Halicka in this book). The vocabulary selected is quite important and the choice of one term over another often has political connotations. We prefer to use the term “forced migrations”

¹ “*Zwangsmigrationen*” in German, “*migrations forcées*” in French.

rather than “ethnic cleansing” because, as Antonio Ferrara argues, “security concerns, or social conflicts or enforcing repression and dispossession – have also prompted policies entailing (either as an instrument or as an outcome, sometimes unintended, but rarely unforeseen) the massive displacement and sometimes the killing of populations identified on grounds other than ethnic ones. In itself it is perhaps enough of a reason to speak about ‘forced migrations’ rather than ethnic cleansing”.² Our use of the term is in line with the definition proposed by Krzysztof Ruchniewicz:

“Forced migrations are usually mass movements of people, which are carried out by direct (the order to leave a place is enforced with violence) or situational coercion (massive threat by violence), exercised by state power organs (independent or with international approval) or local actors (separatists, paramilitary groupings, etc.). The action of (understood in a broad sense) ruling powers is the impulse that triggers the population movement, which does not mean that these migrations would be organized, controlled or take place in a less violent form. Victims are mostly ethnic, social or religious/religiously defined groups, which are to be separated from the rest of the population of the given territories. These are often minorities or other groups which have been given a special status, often as a result of changes in national boundaries. They may be citizens of the former or of a state regarded as hostile, or also, as a result of the disintegration of a multinational state, that bears the necessity of the reconstitution of states - be stateless. Forced migrations usually take place in the context of a war with an external aggressor, a civil war and its domestic effects and/or of the implementation of an ideologically motivated, socio-political project such as the creation of a nationally united state or the totalitarian reconstruction of a society. (...) Forced migrations are also characterized by the fact that the affected persons have no influence on the happening and usually cannot change the “top-down” assignment or categorization (national identity, race, class).”³

In Europe and at its margins, especially during the first half of the XXth century, entire populations – hundreds of thousands and even millions of people – have been expelled or have had to flee from territories situated sometimes in their own state of citizenship, from territories conquered or taken over by another state or because of the displacement of international borders, or in an exchange of population as part of a peace agreement. These populations were

² See Antonio FERRARA, “Eugene Kulischer, Joseph Schechtman and the Historiography of European Forced Migrations”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46 (4), p. 739.

³ Krzysztof RUCHNIEWICZ, “Zwangsmigration” in *Online-Lexikon zur Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa*, 2015. ome-lexikon.uni-oldenburg.de/p32750 (Accessed May, 22 2015). (our translation)

received as refugees and had to integrate (or reintegrate) within a state which was then considered as their homeland.

The purpose of this book is to analyse how hosting states and societies as well as the groups that were forced to leave dealt with the memory of forced migrations in the long-term and how they addressed the different types of loss that were associated with these migrations. Given that many countries in Europe have experienced population transfers during the last century and a half, this issue remains deeply anchored in European memories. In an essay about “the seven circles of European memory”, the German political scientist Claus Leggewie positions the memory of population transfers third in a series of seven concentric circles of supra- and transnational memory. The memory of the Holocaust is at the core of the disc, followed by Soviet communism. Third are “expulsions as a pan-European trauma”.⁴

However, despite the fact that forced migrations have been the fate of many European people, expulsions and population transfers *per se* have never been addressed at the European level, and there has been no official recognition of them across Europe. The absence of debate at the European and European Union (EU) level is rather striking. Given that this trauma is shared by many European communities and by millions of people, forced migrations could have been used as a founding element to develop a European identity for instance, in the same way that the memory of the Holocaust has been used as a negative founding myth. At the European and European Union level, the memory of forced migrations is yet to be perceived as capable of promoting unity and a common identity; similarly, the capacity of division of this memory among neighbours has not been addressed. One can question the inability or unwillingness to address the loss in public debate. Is it linked to its proximity to genocidal acts, as Leggewie has argued?⁵ Is it because the experience of forced migrations, though widely shared by Europeans, is mainly to be found in countries in South-Eastern and North-Eastern Europe which, with the exception of Germany, are not founding members of the European Union? (In reality, this hypothesis is quite problematic because both Italy and France⁶ have been affected by forced population transfers). Or is it because the issue has long been ignored in societies because it was perceived as a divisive issue best avoided in public debate?

⁴ Claus LEGGEWIE, “A Tour of the Battleground: The Seven Circles of Pan-European Memory”, *Social Research*, vol. 75, n°1, Spring 2008, pp. 217-234.

⁵ Claus LEGGEWIE, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung. Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt*, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 27.

⁶ About this, see for instance Philipp THER, “Die ‘Triage’ im Elsass”, in Philipp THER, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. Ethnische Säuberungen im modernen Europa*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012, pp. 86-89.

The frames within which the history of population transfers is usually narrated challenge mainstream Western historiography. As the American historian Benjamin Lieberman argues:

“There has been little place for the ethnically cleansed in standard histories of Europe because historians by custom tell the stories of nations. A focus on ethnic cleansing shifts perspective. The story of the rise of the nation state, often a triumph of self-determination, becomes a story of tragedy for those who were driven out. Moments of liberation and victory are also turning points for expulsion and ethnic cleansing. National heroes become champions of bigotry, aggression and exclusion. And in the case of ordinary people, the record of support for and participation in terror, violence and theft adds a profoundly pessimistic note to the story of modern European progress.”⁷

The temporal frame is also challenged in the sense that in Western historiography, World War I for example, is until today mainly thought of as a trench war and its time frame is identified as 1914-1918. These frames do not apply in the East of Europe, and especially in the South-East, where this war is mainly remembered as a war of massive population displacements and is associated with the memory of the first genocide of the century, namely, the Armenian genocide.⁸ The time frames thus extend to encompass the Balkan wars and even the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (and, even later, the Greek Turkish friendship treaty of 1930). A comparative approach at a European level is a way to take into account these different frames. It puts into question national historical narratives and representations.

The loss is rather easy to identify at the individual level. People have sometimes lost their lives but more often they have lost belongings, their social environment, connections to their ancestry, sometimes a language or a dialect, part of their traditions and customs, know-hows ... and ultimately a homeland (*Heimat*). At the group level, however, it is far more complex to identify that which has been lost. As Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn note in their contribution to this book, what has been lost is often complex, ambiguous, and historically challenged. The repeated shifting of borders and of sovereignty in some territories over a few decades has made it difficult to respond to the question of what belongs to whom and who belongs to what. The complexity of the issue also depends on what is referred to: land and landscapes, buildings, cemeteries or goods? It is quite easy to measure the loss of goods or even land. But what about the identity attached to a territory? This identity has to do with language (idioms), traditions, and social relations within one's own group and/or among groups and

⁷ Benjamin LIEBERMAN, *Terrible Fate. Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015 (2006), Preface, pp. xiv-xv.

⁸ Benjamin LIEBERMAN, *Terrible Fate, op. cit.*, pp.116-117.

communities. Is it possible to understand how the loss of interactions with other groups which once lived on the same territory impacts one's identity? As the Czech Historian and politician František Palacký wrote in the middle of the XIXth century: "The Czech course of history is the interaction and the permanent conflict with the Germans".⁹ How can the loss resulting from the destruction of the relationship with the other be measured? Eva Hahn and Hans-Henning Hahn have studied these issues concerning what has long been referred to as the "German East" in Germany. Their questions correspond perfectly with most cases of forced migrations as several contributions in this book show. For these reasons, we suggest to rethink the patterns of national and group memories by placing them within a wider frame. Indeed, for far too long, these memories have been assessed only as part of national and/or local/group narratives.

The transfer of populations: a political tool recently reshaped to fit within the current pattern of human rights norms

'Population transfers' have been used for centuries as part of domestic and international policies. In the first half of the XXth century, these transfers were still considered a legitimate means for solving minority problems (see for instance the end of the Balkans wars, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 or the transfer of the German populations from the East after World War II mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement, art. 13).¹⁰

Today, forced migrations are denounced as a violation of human rights. They are perceived as a violation of fundamental as well as economic, political and social rights. Population displacement is no longer accepted as a long-term solution to a conflict, at least not by the so-called international community. It might be tolerated as a transitory state before the return of the population and is often presented as such, even though the period of transition may sometimes be rather long. The UN's recognition of a "right to return" of the Palestinian People in 1974 helped change how forced migrations were perceived both at the international level and in international law.¹¹ Ever since, groups of expellees such as the German *Vertriebenen* have repeatedly referred to the UN resolution concerning the Palestinians to reinforce their claims to

⁹ František PALACKÝ, *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a na Moravě* (History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and in Moravia), Prague, 1848, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰ See Philipp THER, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-108.

¹¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, passed on 22 November 1974 declared the right of return to be an "inalienable right".

a right of return (*Heimatrecht*).¹² In addition, Western societies began to pay new attention to victims (of forced migrations) in the 1980s. The public recognition of their suffering led to the idea that they could play a central role in addressing post-conflict situations. Listening to victims and hearing them tell their own narratives became a moral duty.¹³ The Austrian historian, Philipp Ther, highlights a “decisive difference” in the international attitude to the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s compared to the aftermath of World War II. He writes about a “shock effect and the unanimous international rejection”. Ther points out that during the Yugoslav wars “the lack of consent of the great powers and neighbouring states contained the ethnic cleansing and led to the Dayton Peace Agreement and even to the return of refugees”.¹⁴ However, the question remains complex, since this unanimous rejection of population transfers, at least by western democracies, is accompanied by the refusal to reconsider the European post-war order, which is characterized by the recognition of the intangibility of borders and the absence of legal, material or territorial claims linked to it. One can add a will of peaceful cooperation as a fundamental dimension of the European integration.

Today, forced migrations are not only morally condemned but they are also outlawed, at least by the signatories to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which lists, in Article 7 §1 (d), “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” among the crimes against humanity.¹⁵ The current international norm considers population transfers as a crime against peace or humanity. However, as the German historian Michael Schwarz argues, it is still not as clear as that in the case of internationally organized and supervised “population transfers”, especially when those are seen as the last option in an apparently insoluble conflict.¹⁶

Yet, in academic literature as well as in popular representations, population transfers are perceived as belonging to a history of violence.¹⁷ Even though there is a wide consensus among

¹² See the petition sent to the UN by the *Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft* on December 2nd 1975, in which there is an explicit reference to the UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, passed on 22 November 1974, which mentions a right of return for the Palestinians.

¹³ See, *Raisons politiques*, “Les victimes écrivent leur histoire”, n° 30, 2008. Elazar BARKAN, Alexander KARN, (ed.), *Taking wrongs seriously: apologies and reconciliation*, Stanford UP, 2006.

¹⁴ Philipp THER, *Die Dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, *op. cit.*, p. 240. (our translation)

¹⁵ The condemnation of forced migrations (ethnic cleansing), though almost unanimous among academics as well as in the international community of states, is fairly recent and still debated on some points (especially the expulsion of the Germans from East-Central Europe after the Second world war). See the presentation of the discussion by Michael SCHWARZ, “Questions de point de vue : une perspective nationale, européenne et globale sur les ‘purifications’ ethniques modernes”, in Carola HÄHNEL-MESNARD, Dominique HERBET (dir.), *Fuite et expulsion des Allemands. Transnationalité et représentations 19è-21è siècle*, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses du Septentrion, 2016, pp. 38-39. The change of attitude towards using this means in international relations has occurred rather slowly after the Second world war. It is during the wars in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s that international condemnation became clear and almost unanimous.

¹⁶ See Michael SCHWARZ, “Questions de point de vue”, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁷ In his latest book, *The Killing Compartments. The Mentality of Mass Murder*, New Haven, Yale University Press 2015, Abram DE SWAAN places “forced migrations” under the title “Mass Pogroms”.

academics¹⁸ for a need to distinguish them from genocides,¹⁹ forced migrations are considered highly traumatic. Put differently, they are thought to have long-lasting consequences which can be felt even after the disappearance of the generation that experienced them. These migrations are in fact often accompanied by a process of impoverishment and social downgrading of expelled populations which have to endure the loss of most of their property and therefore the loss of their capacity to make a living. Unlike refugees, expellees cannot return, even in the long term. Furthermore, open wounds often persist among expellees and transcend through generations. These include feelings of being uprooted, individual psychological suffering, hate and a desire for revenge. These perceptions usually shift from feelings of injustice to openly revisionist attitudes. As Ernest Renan pointed out, not only is the relation to the past fundamental for creating a common feeling of belonging, but moreover shared sufferings unite far more than shared joys. And “as far as national memories are concerned, mourning is better than triumph, because it imposes duties, it commands common efforts”²⁰ such as for instance the restoration of the Nation’s greatness or pride after a dark episode.²¹ It is thus easy to politically instrumentalize the memory of sufferings endured. For all these reasons, the persistence of such negative memories has become a challenge for peace and stability in Europe and at its margins.²²

¹⁸ This is not the case among the associations of victims of ethnic cleansing or forced migrations, which often draw outspoken or inferred parallels between these two forms of mass violence – with the aim to gain the same status as victims as those of Genocide – one of the crimes that gets internationally the highest opprobrium.

¹⁹ See Michael MANN, *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 7-8 and p. 17, or Benjamin LIEBERMANN, *Terrible Fate, op.cit.*, p. XIV, or Stéphane ROSIÈRE, *Le nettoyage ethnique. Tereur et peuplement*, Paris, Ellipses, 2006, p. 6, or Norman NAIMARK, “Ethnic Cleansing”, *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, [online], published on 4 November 2007 (accessed 9 March 2016), URL: <http://www.massviolence.org/Ethnic-Cleansing>, ISSN 1961-9898, or Philipp THER, *Die Dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten, op.cit.*, pp. 8-9 and Michael SCHWARZ, *Ethnische “Säuberungen” in der Moderne. Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013, pp. 2-3, place forced migrations on a continuum of mass violence that goes from pogroms to genocide, all of them insisting nevertheless on the necessity to analitically distinguish forced migrations/ ethnic cleansing from the latter. As Philipp Ther puts it: “Ethnic cleansing and genocides differ in several respects, in terms of objectives, results and in their spatial dimensions. In the case of a genocide, the destruction of a certain population group is the goal, for which a specific intent (*dolus specialis*) is assumed in international law. The primary goal of ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, is the systematic removal of a population group from a certain territory”, and he pursues, “another argument for a differentiation between ethnic cleansing and genocide is based on the – for the historian - inevitable consideration of spatial dimensions of history. Expulsions and forced relocations were always associated with spatial conceptions of target and receiving areas, usually a co-ethnic state. Accordingly, most of the ethnic cleansing was transborder (...) Genocides are at best based on a deportation to nowhere, symbolized by the end of the railway tracks in Auschwitz-Birkenau.” Philipp THER, *Die Dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten, op. cit.*, pp. 8-9. (our translation)

²⁰ Ernest RENAN, *Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation, ?* 1882, p. 51; URL : http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/renan_ernest/qu_est_ce_une_nation/renan_quest_ce_une_nation.pdf

²¹ Benjamin LIEBERMAN, *Terrible Fate, op.cit.*, p. 34

²² Catherine PERRON, “§96 Bundesvertriebenengestetz. Ein Instrument der Versöhnung Deutschlands mit seinen mittel-und osteuropäischen Nachbarn?” in Corine Defrance, Ulrich Pfeil (eds.) *Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem „Zivilisationsbruch“? Deutschland und Europa nach 1945*, Bruxelles, P.I.E Peter Lang, 2016, pp. 499-518.

The role of the past in international relations: how and why does the memory of forced migrations count today within the European integration context?

The past interferes with international relations in different ways. As the Belgian political scientist Valérie Rosoux pointed out, one must distinguish between the weight of the past and the choice of the past, two concepts which, in reality, are in constant interaction.²³ The choice of history refers to how actors choose (or not) to use references to the past. How they interpret history and choose their references depends on their present preoccupations. In many cases, the past is used as a keystone argument both within national and international contexts. It is a factor that helps legitimize one's position and claims, and it is a political issue as well. The weight of the past can be understood across different levels: when the memory of a past event shapes the perception of the current reality; when the consequences of the past weigh on current policies; and ultimately, through actors' personal histories.

Interpretations of the past often diverge. The same event can be interpreted differently and take on a greater or lesser role in the following period,²⁴ or a different meaning depending on the periodization in history. For instance, did the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe in 1945-47 occur during the last period of the war or, on the contrary, during the first post-war period? These two interpretations have quite different political consequences. The choice of the terms relating to population transfers also illustrates divergent interpretations of the phenomenon.²⁵ These divergences are not *per se* a problem in international relations; they are normal, often necessary, and they offer a constructive basis for dialogue. They cannot, however, be ignored. On numerous occasions, conflicts from the past associated with forced migrations have poisoned bilateral relations. A recent example is the conditionality linked to the abolition of the Beneš Decrees that a few German politicians tried to impose on the Czech Republic

²³ Valérie ROSOUX, *Les usages de la mémoire dans les relations internationales. Le recours au passé dans la politique étrangère de la France à l'égard de l'Allemagne et de l'Algérie de 1962 à nos jours*, Brussels, Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 2001.

²⁴ For example, the History of the Teutonic Order, which is presented in Polish textbooks as part of German expansionism toward the East, while German textbooks focus on the civilizing dimension of these conquests. For further details, see the work of the Polish historian Jerzy Holzer, who was a member of the German-Polish Historian commission.

²⁵ See Eva HAHNOVÁ (HAHN), *Sudetoněmecký problém: obtížné loučení s minulostí* (The Sudeto-German issue: a difficult farewell to the past), Prague 1996. Chapter 7 is entirely dedicated to this aspect "Our history: the Czech-German past, a problem of interpretation", pp. 174-199.

during the European integration process. Until 2004, the Sudeten German question had been repeatedly instrumentalized in the debate about the expansion of the European Union, both at the European level (European Commission, European Parliament) and at the national level in Austria, Hungary or Germany.²⁶

Dealing with the memory of the loss and forced migrations

In addition to historians, other kinds of stakeholders are likely to take an interest in the memory of the loss and forced migrations. These may include the displaced persons themselves – individually or in groups – as well as states and governments. While these actors are quite independent, they interact at different levels. For instance, a state can relay claims internationally, and a government can financially support associations of expellees or, on the contrary, denounce their actions. Shifts across categories and even positions are not uncommon. Leaders of associations may engage in politics to defend their cause. In the German case for instance, many historians dealing with these issues from the 1960s to the 1990s were expellees themselves and were often members of the *Landsmannschaften*. Moreover, leaders of these associations were active politicians in Bavaria or at the federal level.²⁷ These stakeholders certainly cannot be placed into a unified and homogeneous category. The distinction between historians and memory entrepreneurs is often blurred. As the Italian historian Enzo Traverso has rightly pointed out about the politics of history, “In exile, borders between the scholar and the activist become porous, unstable”.²⁸ Two reasons could explain this: the first is the marginal position of the exiled in the hosting society, and the second is their status as losers. The same is true in the case of forced migrations, the difference being that expellees often had to endure a double defeat. In the German, Italian, Finnish and Greek cases, not only did expellees become part of a defeated nation, they also had to endure their loss. This outsider position may have

²⁶ Anne BAZIN, “Les décrets Beneš. De l’usage du passé dans le débat européen”, *Critique Internationale*, n° 21, octobre 2003, pp. 42-51.

In Germany, however, this was not the case at the government level. See Gerhard SCHROEDER, *Rede anlässlich des 50. Jahrestages der Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen am Tag der Heimat*, September 3rd, 2000, in Berlin.

²⁷ See the debate about the *Ostforschung* in the late 1990s in Germany: Anne BAZIN, “Dědictví studené války v přístupu k sudetské otázce v Německu a v České republice” (The Cold War legacy on the treatment of the Sudete issue in Germany and the Czech Republic), in Muriel BLAIVE & Georges MINK (ed.): *Benešovy dekrety. Budoucnost Evropy a vyrovnávání s minulostí* (The Benes’ decrees. The future of Europe and the politics of the past), Prague, Dokořán, 2003, pp. 40-52.

²⁸ Enzo TRAVERSO, *L’histoire comme champ de bataille*, Paris, La Découverte, 2012, p. 216 (our translation).

nourished a critical attitude toward mainstream national history writing. Furthermore, these stakeholders (professional or amateur historians, editorialists, leaders of associations, politicians, artists ...) have their own rationality and are pursuing their own objectives. They can either oppose each other in their use of the past for political, personal or very pragmatic reasons, or they can cooperate.

To examine how this troublesome past has been addressed in different countries, we will draw on the concept of “politics of history” (*Geschichtspolitik*). According to Edgar Wolfrum, politics of history is “a field of action and politics on which actors load history with their specific interests and try to politically use it. The politics of history aims at publicity and seeks legitimizing, mobilizing, politicizing scandalizing and defaming effects in the political dispute”.²⁹ Politics of history can be addressed in two ways. The first pays attention to actors competing to impose their narratives and interpretations of the past (for instance by promoting a specific aspect of the past or focusing on a period in particular, thereby silencing other moments or downplaying some events) to their actions, to the interactions they share, and to national and international (normative) contexts. The second focuses on how the past is remembered and memories kept alive: celebrations, memorial days, rituals and the performance of these rituals, building of memorials; the establishment of institutions dealing with the past (commissions of historians, academic or political institutions dealing with the past), exhibitions, museums, archives, and so on. Naturally, this dimension also focuses on any type of memory-related activities undertaken by civil society in an attempt to create or transmit historical consciousness, that is media productions dealing with history (films, documentaries, witness interviews), or individual production of narratives about the past such as novels, autobiographies, or artworks.

The concept of politics of history makes it possible to overcome the binary and somewhat static vision opposing the influence of institutionalized forms of memory of the past on the one hand, and on the other the resistance of individual, family or group memories to a vision of the past imposed from above. By highlighting the polity dimensions (forms, actors, institutions), the political aspects (processes and structuring) and the policies (understood as the content promoted), the concept allows to examine how actors occupying multiple positions, i.e., political, administrative, academic and/or militant positions, are struggling to make sense of the past and shape public memory and, in so doing, impose their vision of the future. Focusing on the politics of history dealing with the burdensome past of lost territories and

²⁹ Edgar WOLFRUM, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999, p. 25.

forced migrations enables to identify the legacy of these experiences in societies, public memory, and within domestic and foreign (neighbouring) politics and policies. It also makes it possible to analyze the competition relative to the interpretation of past events and to address the interaction between official memory, history as a science, and primary experiences through individual memories. By comparing different case studies of politics of history related to the loss in Europe and at its margins, this book intends to contribute to a comparative research analyzing the emergence of a new approach to collective memory and memory culture that includes all forms of public representations of the past.

State of the art: addressing the loss in academic literature

The origins, uses and history of the loss of territories and forced migrations has been largely addressed in academic literature. The first studies about forced migrations before World War II focused on the Greek-Turkish population exchange and on South-Eastern European cases.³⁰ During and immediately after World War II, the main studies on the subject were conducted in the United States by Joseph Schechtman and Eugene Kulischer, two Jews born in Russia who had themselves fled their home country.³¹ Schechtman first studied “all possible aspects of population transfers in Europe during World War Two”, the majority of which concerned the resettlement of German minorities from Eastern Europe implemented by the 3rd Reich.³² During the war and its immediate wake, Schechtman and Kulischer pursued their research on population transfers not only in Europe,³³ but also in the Middle-East (Arab refugees)³⁴ and Asia (population transfers between India and Pakistan). Kulischer coined the

³⁰ Stelio SÉFÉRIADES, “L’échange des populations”, Académie de droit International, *Recueil des cours*, 1928, IV; André WURFBAIN, *L’échange Gréco-Bulgare des minorités ethniques*, Lausanne, 1930 ; Stephen LADAS, *The Exchange of Minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New-York, 1932; André RODOCONARCHI, *Les finances de la Grèce et l’établissement des réfugiés*, Paris, 1934; G. STREIT, *Der Lausanner Vertrag und der griechisch-türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch*, Berlin, 1929.

³¹ Antonio FERRARA, “Eugene Kulischer, Joseph Schechtman and the Historiography of European Forced Migrations”, *op.cit.*, pp. 715-740.

³² Joseph SCHECHTMAN, *European population transfers 1939-1945*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. ix.

³³ Eugene KULISCHER, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, Montreal, 1943; Joseph SCHECHTMAN, *European population transfers, op. cit.*; Eugene KULISCHER, *Europe on the move: war and population changes 1917-1947*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948; Joseph SCHECHTMAN, *Postwar population transfers in Europe 1945-1955*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962.

³⁴ Joseph SCHECHTMAN, *The Arab Refugee Problem*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1952.

term “displaced person” and was also “the author of many estimates of the population losses caused by the Second World War”.³⁵

During the next three decades, no more global research on forced migrations was conducted. Only case studies were undertaken, and they were often carried out by directly concerned individuals or governments, mostly focusing on the German *Vertriebene(n)*.³⁶ The subject began to attract renewed interest after the breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of Cold war.³⁷ Archives became widely accessible and national history began to be reassessed at the same time that the wars in the former Yugoslavia showed the European people that forced migrations were also a European tragedy.³⁸ Population transfers and ethnic cleansing became a subject of academic debate, mostly in Anglo-Saxon publications.³⁹ In the same period, drawing on the studies undertaken by Schechtman and Kulischer, the American Sociologist Andrew Bell-Fialkoff attempted to renew – though in a

³⁵ Antonio FERRARA, “Eugene Kulischer, Joseph Schechtman and the Historiography of European Forced Migrations”, *op.cit.*, p. 723.

³⁶ Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Theodor SCHIEDER (ed.), *Die Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa* (1953-1962) (See the analysis of Mathias Beer about the Genesis and Development of this project in Mathias BEER, “Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Das Großforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa’”, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 46, 1998n pp. 345-389); Johann W. BRUEGEL, “Die Aussiedlung der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei, Versuch einer Darstellung der Vorgeschichte”, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 2. Heft, April 1960, pp. 134-164; Alfred DE ZAYAS, *Nemesis at Potsdam: the Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans. Background, execution, consequences*, London/Boston, Routledge & K. Paul, 1977; Wolfgang BENZ, *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen*, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch, 1985.

See also Renée HIRSCHON, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe. The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.

³⁷ Rogers BRUBAKER, “Aftermaths of Empires and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 18, n°2, April 1995, pp. 189–218

³⁸ Benjamin KOSTRUBIEC, “Bouleversements territoriaux et migrations forcées au 20e siècle en Pologne”, *Espace populations sociétés*, n° 2, 1992, pp. 203-214; Alexandre TOURMAKINE, *Les migrations des populations musulmanes balkaniques en Anatolie*, Istanbul, Beylerbeyi, 1995; Detlef BRANDES, Edita IVANICKOVA, and Jiří PESEK. *Erzwungene Trennung: Vertreibungen und Aussiedlungen in und aus der Tschechoslowakei 1938-1947 im Vergleich mit Polen, Ungarn und Jugoslawien*, Essen, Klartext Verlag, 1999.

³⁹ Dariusz STOLA, “Forced Migrations in Central European History”, *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, n° 2, 1992, pp. 324-341; Christopher GOEBEL, “A Unified Concept of Population Transfer (revised)”, *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, n° 22 (1), aut.1993, pp. 1–27; Joseph SCHECHLA, “Ideological Roots of Population Transfer”, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, n° 2, 1993, pp. 239-275; Bill FRELICK, “Faultlines of Nationality Conflict: Refugees and Displaced Persons from Armenia and Azerbaijan” *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 6, n° 4, 1 January 1994, pp. 581–619; John MCGARRY, Brendan O’LEARY, “The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 47, n° 1, 1994, pp. 94-115; Akbar S. AHMED “Ethnic cleansing’: a metaphor for our time?”, *Ethnic and racial studies*, vol. 18, n° 1, January 1995, pp. 1-25; Rogers BRUBAKER, “Aftermaths of Empires and the Unmixing of Peoples”, *op. cit.*; Chaim KAUFMANN, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”, *International Security*, n° 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-175; Christa MEINDERSMA, “Population Exchanges: International Law and State Practice. I”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, vol. 9, n° 3, 1997, pp. 335-364; Chaim KAUFMANN, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century”, *International Security*, vol. 23, n° 2, Fall 1998, pp. 120-156; John MCGARRY, “Demographic engineering’: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, n° 4, July 1998, pp. 613-638; Arthur HELTON, “What Is Forced Migration?” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, Summer, n° 4, 1999, pp. 521–532.

quite controversial manner – a global reflection on forced migrations.⁴⁰ However, it was not until the turn of the millennium and the first decade of the 21st century that the number of publications on the subject reached a peak.⁴¹

Until the end of the 1990s, territorial losses and forced migrations were predominantly examined within national frames. In the German case, for instance, most of the publications were dedicated to the analysis either of the historical and political dimension of the loss (establishing facts and figures,⁴² understanding causes and identifying mechanisms that forced people to leave,⁴³ looking at how borders were drawn and redrawn), or they dealt with its legal, psychological, sociological or cultural dimensions (investigating traumas, analyzing the integration of displaced populations into their host society which, sometimes, was supposedly their own former community,⁴⁴ their specific customs, traditions, language and beliefs⁴⁵).

⁴⁰ Andrew BELL-FIALKOFF, *Ethnic cleansing*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1996.

⁴¹ Norman NAIMARK, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic cleansing in XXth Century Europe*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2001; Philipp THER, Ana SILJAK (eds.) *Redrawing Nations. Ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, Lanham, Boulder, New-York, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001; Michael MANN, *The Dark Side of democracy*, op.cit.; Wolfgang BENZ, *Ausgrenzung, Vertreibung, Völkermord. Genozid im 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich, dtv, 2006; Stéphane ROSIÈRE, *Le nettoyage ethnique*, op. cit.; Benjamin LIEBERMAN, *Terrible Fate*, op. cit.; Pertti AHONEN, Gustavo CORNI, Jerzy KOCHANOWSKI, Rainer SCHULZE, Tamás STARK, Barbara STELZL-MARX, *People on the Move. Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath*, Oxford, 2008; Ralph MELVILLE, Jiří PEŠEK, Claus SCHARF, (ed.) *Zwangsmigrationen im mittleren und östlichen Europa. Völkerrecht – Konzeptionen – Praxis (1938-1950)*, Mainz 2008; Witold SIENKIEWICZ, Grzegorz HRYCIUK (ed.), *Wysiedlenia, wypędzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959: atlas ziem Polski: Polacy, Żydzi, Niemcy, Ukraińcy*, Warszawa, Demart, 2008 (Translated into German : Witold SIENKIEWICZ, Grzegorz HRYCIUK, (ed.); *Zwangsumsiedlung, Flucht und Vertreibung, 1939-1959, Atlas zur Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas*; Warszawa, Demart S. A. 2010, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010); Richard BESSEL, Claudia HAAKE, (eds.), *Removing Peoples. Forced Removal in the Modern World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Jessica REINISCH; Elizabeth WHITE (eds.) *The disentanglement of populations. Migration, Expulsion, and Displacement in Post-War Europe, 1944-9*, Basingstoke, New-York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Philipp THER, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, op.cit.; Antonio FERRARA, Niccolò PIANCIOLA, *L'Età delle Migrazioni Forzate. Esodi e Deportazioni in Europa 1853-1953*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012; Michael SCHWARZ, *Ethnische "Säuberungen" in der Moderne*, op.cit.; Jan PIKORSKI, *Die Verjagten, Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, Siedler, 2013; Michel BRUNEAU, *De l'Asie mineure à la Turquie. Minorités, homogénéisation ethno-nationale, diaspora*, Paris CNRS Editions, 2015; Bulutgil, ZEYNEP. *The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016.

⁴² Tomáš STANĚK, *Odsun Němců z Československa 1945-47* (The transfer of the Germans from Czechoslovakia 1945-47), Praha, 1991.

⁴³ Ferdinand SEIBT, *Deutschland und die Tschechen, Geschichte einer Nachbarschaft in der Mitte Europas*, Munich, Piper, 1993; Walter ZIEGLER (ed.), *Die Vertriebenen vor der Vertreibung. Die Heimatländer der deutschen Vertriebenen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Strukturen, Entwicklungen, Erfahrungen*, Munich: Iudicium, 1999; Volker ZIMMERMANN, *Die Sudetendeutschen im NS-Staat. Politik und Stimmung der Bevölkerung im Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938-1945)*, Essen, Klartext, 1999.

⁴⁴ Renée HIRSCHON, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe*, op.cit.; Elisabeth KONTOGIORGI, *Population exchanges in Greek Macedonia. The Forced Resettlement of Refugees, 1922-1930*, Basingstoke, New York, 2006; Olivier FORCADE, Philippe NIVET (ed.), *Les réfugiés en Europe. Du XVI au XXème siècle*. Paris, Nouveaux monde éditions, 2008; Andreas KOSSERT, *Kalte Heimat, Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945*, Munich, Siedler Verlag, 2008; Karin POHL, *Zwischen Integration und Isolation: Zur kulturellen Dimension der Vertriebenenpolitik, in Bayern (1945-1975)*, München, Iudicium Verlag, 2009.

⁴⁵ This has for instance very much been the case in Germany where in the 1950s the ethnologists were very keen to collect dialects, folk songs, clothing, cooking, customs and traditions from the expellees, in order to save what was in their eyes in danger of disappearing. See Hermann BAUSINGERS analysis of the phenomenon in *Volkskunde. Von der Altertumsforschung zur Kulturanalyse*, Tübingen, Tübinger Vereinigung für Volkskunde, 1971.

Interestingly, other issues were neglected. For instance, no attention was paid to the question of the repopulation of vacant territories in the countries of departure or to the global and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon.

In the last two decades, the research framework has considerably evolved. The approach of the loss of territories and forced population movements has shifted in an attempt to overcome national centeredness. This evolution is partly due to the internationalization and Europeanization of the issue as well as to a new space dedicated to victims, as mentioned earlier. In western societies, individual suffering seems to have overcome collective prejudices. What is now denounced is no longer the damage inflicted to a state, a social class or an ethnic group, but rather the consequences on an individual's physical and moral integrity as well as on his or her dignity. At the same time, how memories are recalled today has also changed and has shifted from national frames to social groups, families and individual victims.⁴⁶ This new approach mirrors the new focus on victims in war studies. It can be partly explained by the fact that in the XXth century, a new way of conducting war emerged in which civilians became more substantially involved in conflicts in different ways.

In this respect, the end of the 1990s was a turning point in Germany for instance following the initiation of a debate about German victims of World War II. The debate concerned German civilian victims of the war including those who had died under allied bombings, women raped by allied soldiers at the end of the war, and also expellees from Eastern Europe.⁴⁷ The success of the novel *Im Krebsgang* written by the Nobel Prize winner Günter Grass in 2002 is a good illustration of this. Moreover, numerous novels, TV-documentaries and media investigations dealing with this issue were published or broadcast in the early 2000s.⁴⁸ The debate in Germany raised new questions about the contextualization of events and the need to promote a broader approach to the issue, especially because the political context had changed. Indeed, the Eastern neighbours (Poland, Czech Republic), the *Heimat* of millions of

⁴⁶ Sandrine LEFRANC, Lilian MATHIEU, Johanna SIMEANT, "Les victimes écrivent leur histoire", *Raisons politiques*, n° 30, 2008/2, and also Didier FASSIN, Richard RECHTMAN, *L'empire du traumatisme. Enquête sur la condition de victime*, Paris, Flammarion, 2007.

⁴⁷ See the documentaries on TV about the bombing of Dresden or the success of the book by the Historian Jörg FRIEDRICH, *Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-45*, München, Propyläen Verlag, 2002, about the allied bombing of Germany during and at the end of the war; Brigitte RAUSCHENBACH, "L'ambiguïté des sémantiques de la victime en Allemagne", *Critique internationale*, n° 38, 2008, pp. 177-189; and from the same author a book review about *Luftkrieg und Literatur* from Wilhelm SEBALD, "L'absence de la parole et sa traduction", *Critique internationale*, n° 24, 2004, pp. 195-199.

⁴⁸ See the documentary series, *Die große Flucht*, broadcast on ZDF in November and December 2001; the news magazine *Der Spiegel* (n° 13-14-15, March and April 2002) published a series of reportages about the German expulsion titled "*Die Deutschen als Opfer*". The front page of *Der Spiegel* on February 4, 2002 was about the shipwreck of the *Wilhelm-Gustloff* (a boat full of expellees who were trying to flee on the Baltic Sea when they were torpedoed by the Soviets and sunk).

German expellees, had become democracies and were more open to dialogue, even on difficult issues such as the forced transfer of populations. In the early 2000s, there was a rather tense debate about the proposition of the Federation of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen*) to create a “Center against expulsions” (*Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen*) in Berlin. The reaction of the Eastern neighbours – namely Poland⁴⁹ – led numerous historians in both Germany and Poland to not only take part in the debate but to also engage in common research projects in order to overcome national frames.⁵⁰

The perspective of EU-accession for Central European States in 2004 was clearly a major incentive for trans-Europeanizing the issue. It brought new insights, such as the interest for a transnational historiography of a phenomenon as intertwined as forced migrations.⁵¹ It also gave way to a focus on scale variations, i.e., on a local, national, and supranational level in order to better grasp the complexity of the phenomenon.⁵² The frequently changing patterns between perpetrators and victims according to power constellations⁵³ has been addressed or, closely related to this, the fact that repatriation also frequently became a way to colonize marginal territories.⁵⁴ For instance, the massive resettlement of Greek refugees from Asia

⁴⁹ See Dieter LANGEWIESCHE, Edita IVANIČKOVÁ und Alena MÍŠKOVÁ (ed.), *Mythen und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert, Deutsche – Tschechen – Slowaken*, Veröffentlichungen der Deutsch-Tschechischen und Deutsch-Slowakischen Historikerkommission Bd. 18; zugleich: Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte im östlichen Europa Bd. 42, Essen 2013; Detlef BRANDES, Dušan KOVÁČ und Jiří PEŠEK (eds.), *Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken 1848-1989*, Veröffentlichungen der Deutsch-Tschechischen und Deutsch-Slowakischen Historikerkommission Bd. 14; zugleich: Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte im östlichen Europa Bd. 2, Essen 2007; Christoph CORNELIBEN, Roman HOLEC und Jiří PEŠEK (eds.), *Diktatur – Krieg – Vertreibung. Erinnerungskulturen in Tschechien, der Slowakei und Deutschland seit 1945*, Veröffentlichungen der Deutsch-Tschechischen und Deutsch-Slowakischen Historikerkommission Bd. 13; zugleich: Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte im östlichen Europa Bd. 26, Essen 2005; Thomas STROBEL, Dariusz WOJTASZYN, “Das Deutsch-Polnische Geschichtsbuch - ein neues Element im historischen Dialog zwischen Polen und Deutschen” in Elżbieta OPIŁOWSKA, Krzysztof RUCHNIEWICZ, Marek ZYBURA (eds.) *“Das Friedenszeichen von Kreisau” und “Der Händedruck von Verdun”: Wege zur deutsch-polnischen und deutsch-französischen Versöhnung und ihre Symbole im kollektiven Gedächtnis der Gesellschaften*, Wrocław, 2000, pp. 179-189.

⁵⁰ The *Lexikon der Vertreibungen* is one of the attempts to Europeanize the question of forced migrations. See Detlef BRANDES, Holm SUNDHAUSSEN, Stefan TROEBST (ed.), *Lexikon der Vertreibungen. Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Wien, Böhlau, 2010. See also Martin SCHULZE-WESSEL et al., 9. September 2010; URL: <http://www.dt-ds-historikerkommission.de/konzept.pdf>.

⁵¹ Keith S. BROWN (ed.), “Homelands in question: Paradoxes of memory and exile in South-Eastern Europe”, *Balkanologie*, vol. V, n° 1-2, 2001.

⁵² In chronological order: Philipp THER, Ana SILJAK (eds.) *Redrawing Nations, op.cit.*; Michael MANN, *The Dark Side of Democracy, op.cit.*, Anja KRÜKE (ed.) *Zwangsmigration und Vertreibung. Europa im 20. Jahrhundert*, Bonn, Verlag Dietz, 2006; Benjamin LIEBERMANN, *Terrible Fate, op.cit.*; Stéphane ROSIÈRE, *Le nettoyage ethnique, op.cit.*; Richard BESSEL, Claudia HAAKE, (ed.), *Removing people, op.cit.*; Detlef BRANDES, Holm SUNDHAUSSEN, Stefan TROEBST (ed.), *Lexikon der Vertreibungen, op.cit.*; Jessica REINISCH, Elizabeth WHITE (ed.) *The disentanglement of populations, op.cit.*

⁵³ As Michael SCHWARZ writes, the necessity of becoming cautious and of a great discernment because of the frequent changing of roles between victims and perpetrators depending on the power constellations that demands that we “become cautious about the risk of sacralization of the victims of a particular policy of violence” (our translation), in Michael Schwarz, “Questions de point de vue”, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵⁴ Keith S. BROWN (ed.), “Homelands in question“, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Minor in Macedonia among Slavic-speaking populations significantly transformed the demographic character of the territory; likewise the Poles who were forced to leave the former Eastern part of Poland (*Kresy*) were transferred to the German vacated region in the new Western Poland;⁵⁵ and the Italians from Istria and Dalmatia were resettled in the Trentino-Alto-Adige region where a German-speaking minority was living.

In this context, little attention has been paid to an important question: how would these issues interfere with the present and how would they evolve according to the political constraints of good neighbourhood and European/international standards that have emerged since the end of the Cold War? As a matter of fact, the analysis carried out in the field of memory-studies, i.e., distinct from history, are rare. This may reflect the difficulty in dealing with the memory of the communist terror and totalitarianism in Western European countries.⁵⁶ Comparative analyses have so far been rare because they are perceived as problematic in the sense that comparativism may lead to relativism. In Germany, the public debate about the “Center against expulsions” and its strong politicization stood in stark contrast to the progress of historical research.⁵⁷ This discrepancy suggests that it is necessary to pay even greater attention to historical representations (*Geschichtsbilder*), myths, and memory frames and to their evolution. It is only towards the end of the 2000s that the first studies dealing with these questions were published.⁵⁸

How can the loss be addressed? The objective of our research project

Drawing on the available literature, our collaborative book attempts to help close the gaps outlined above by addressing the issue of loss by focusing on memory issues and on

⁵⁵ Catherine GOUSSEFF, *Échanger les peuples - Le déplacement des minorités aux confins polono-soviétiques (1944-1947)*, Paris, Fayard, 2015.

⁵⁶ See debates in the European Parliament before the adoption of the resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism.

⁵⁷ Philipp THER and Jürgen DANYEL, (ed.), "Nach der Vertreibung: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer kontroversen Erinnerung", vol. 10, (Introduction) *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 2005, vol. 10, p. 867.

⁵⁸ Concerning the German case, one can cite, for instance: Andrew DEMSHUK, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012; Christian LOTZ, *Die Deutung des Verlusts: Erinnerungspolitische Kontroversen im geteilten Deutschland um Flucht, Vertreibung und die Ostgebiete (1948-1972)*, Köln Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 2007; Philipp THER, Jürgen DANYEL (eds.) "Nach der Vertreibung", *op.cit.*

Concerning other national cases such as Italy, see Marina CATTARUZZA, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007.

politics of history. Unlike in the studies cited above, its objective is not to further the analysis of forced migrations, but rather to shed light on the conflicts of memory concerning loss as well as on latent conflicts. To this end, it analyzes the historical and memorial constructions that nourish them. We believe that this dimension is extremely important because memory is a fundamental aspect when addressing forced migrations. Most of the states/governments who expelled populations – or carried out “transfers” as they have called them – have worked at erasing as much as they can anything that might recall the presence of these populations. At the same time, the populations collectively forced to leave consider their duty to remember as a high priority enabling to maintain the identity of the group. Refusing to forget was, in some cases, a means to maintaining possible claims on lost land and property, or even a right to return.



Figure 1: Monument situated at the entrance of the Burghaldenfriedhof in Sindelfingen – Germany. “To the unforgotten homeland and its dead – Federation of Expellees”

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Figure 2: Reverse side of the Monument – Burghaldenfriedhof Sindelfingen, Germany

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With regard to those who forced the departure of entire groups, history has been rewritten (for communist regimes for instance, see Beata Halicka's chapter on the Polish case in this book) or silenced (see Etienne Copeaux's analysis of how Turkey addressed the loss in this book). Symbols or monuments inherited from expelled groups (churches or mosques, cemeteries, architectural testimonies, street names, inscriptions on buildings, etc.) were destroyed, erased or transformed. New historical narratives were released in an attempt to re-legitimize the expulsion *ex post*. This held true even when the regime had changed from authoritarianism to democracy, as was the case in Central Europe after 1989, and even after original justifications (such as collective guilt) for population transfers were no longer accurate or morally acceptable. After regime changes, new arguments were found to maintain a fragile stability and to avoid paving the way for any claims of restitution, compensation, right of return or even debates about the role of the former government, the army and/or elites in the process of forced transfer.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See in the Czechoslovakian case how this debate about expulsion, which was initiated among dissidents (Charta 77), never reached the rest of the society. In Czechoslovakia and Poland during the Cold War there were debates about the recent past but these were carried out in the very restricted circles of the dissidents. In these countries, the expulsion of Germans was presented by the communist governments as a necessary and just act which would provide a solution to the German problem. After 1945/1948, neither intellectuals nor politicians publicly questioned the principle of expulsion in the two countries. Any statement diverging from the official interpretation

This book addresses these issues using a comparative approach. Our objective is to go beyond a simple identification of similarities and common issues. We have thus deliberately decided to base the comparison on a diachronic approach from the Greek-Turkish population exchange in the 1920s (See Bruneau and Copeaux in this book) to the departure of the Jews from Egypt and from Islamic countries until the end of the 1960s (see Baussant in this book). This approach allows to analyze historical and memorial processes over the long term. The available academic literature⁶⁰ on modern forced migrations reveals neither a clear consensus on periodization nor on the spatial dimension of the phenomenon. Some authors, such as Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, have traced back the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ to antiquity (to the Assyrians) when conquered people were forced to move, or to the Middle-age forms of religious cleansing.⁶¹ As far as Europe is concerned, the debate has largely focused on the question of whether forced migrations are a phenomenon typical of the XXth century⁶² or whether they can be traced back to the beginning of the XIXth century (in Greece and later in the Ottoman and Russian Empires).⁶³ Three to four periods are usually distinguished in the XXth century. These can roughly be summed up as follows: 1. 1912-1923 territorial losses and forced migrations linked to the end of the Ottoman Empire (Balkan wars and Greek-Turkish population exchange) with a focus on South-Eastern Europe that often overlooks the fact that forced migrations also

would have been accused of supporting West-German revanchism. The German question reappeared in the Czechoslovak dissidence at the end of the 1970s in a debate on totalitarianism; this was actually the common denominator of the political writings of the dissidents. It was first addressed by questioning the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after the war and it revolved around three main issues. A moral question: by subscribing to the theory of “collective guilt”, did President Benes and the post-war Czechoslovak political elite break with the humanist principles on which democratic Czechoslovakia had been based in 1918? A political question: the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia had, to a large extent, sealed the alliance of President Benes (in exile) with the communists, under Stalin's patronage. Because transfers of populations had been the privilege of the two totalitarianisms of the XXth century, had the barely restored Czechoslovak democracy made a first step towards the establishment of a totalitarian regime by depriving the non Slavic minorities of their civil rights on the basis of ethnic criteria? And lastly, an identity question: the disappearance of the German minority had profoundly transformed the nature of Czech society. Should the expulsion of the Germans, which had deprived the Czechs of an essential interlocutor, be considered as a “Pyrrhic victory” for the Czechs? The debate on the question of the transfer of the Sudeten Germans was very controversial and raised numerous and difficult questions of the recent past in Czechoslovakia. However, it remained confined to the very limited circles of the dissidence and never reached the rest of society. While the people no longer subscribed to communist propaganda concerning German revanchism, their position on transfers did not shift from a national(-ist) approach: the expulsion was an historic fact and one could not and did not have to look back. There was no reason to discuss it. See Bohumil ČERNÝ, Jan KŘEN, Václav KURAL, Milan OTÁHAL (ed.), *Češi, Němci, odsun, Diskuse nezávislých historiků*, (Czechs, Germans, transfert, discussion among independent historians), Prague, Academia, 1990; Jacques RUPNIK, *The Other Europe. Rise and Fall of Communism of East Central Europe*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988; Anne BAZIN, “Václav Havel et la question allemande”, *op.cit.*

⁶⁰ See for instance Philipp THER, *Die Dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, *op.cit.*. For an indepth discussion about “times and spaces” of ethnic cleansing, see Michael SCHWARTZ, *Etnische Säuberungen in der Moderne*, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-20.

⁶¹ Andrew BELL FIALKOFF, *Ethnic cleansing*, *op.cit.*

⁶² Norman NAIMARK, *Fires of Hatred*, *op.cit.*, and Philipp THER *Die Dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, *op.cit.*

⁶³ Argument of Benjamin LIEBERMANN, *Terrible Fate*, *op.cit.*, p. xi, and Michael SCHWARTZ, *Etnische Säuberungen in der Moderne*, *op.cit.*

took place elsewhere in Europe at that time (in the French region of Alsace for instance); 2. 1938-44: forced migrations and territorial rearrangements linked to the German occupation of Europe and Nazi visions of a new European order (this period has sometimes been extended to the 1930s and comprises the Soviet mass deportations as a result of totalitarian rule); 3. 1944/45-1948, forced migrations linked to the end of the Second World War and the reorganization of Eastern Europe (change of borders but not only). This period also includes population displacements within the USSR. Little attention is given to cases of forced migrations in the rest of the world as a result of the post-WWII new world order and of decolonization. It must be said, however, that these population displacements also affected Europe either because of the arrival of citizens of other European countries (for example the Italians or French from lost overseas colonies or Jews from Muslim countries) or because European colonial powers shared a responsibility in events such as the Palestinian Nakba, population exchanges following the Indian partition, or the departure of Jews from Muslim countries (see Michele Baussant's chapter in this book); and 4. 1988/91-1999: the reemergence of the phenomenon of forced migrations during the Yugoslav wars as well as in South Caucasus.

The spatial delimitation of the phenomenon is hardly more consensual. While most of the studies have focused on Europe in one way or another, Europe has been defined in widely varying ways (for instance the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus, and Russia). We have therefore chosen to go beyond a chronological and/or regional approach and to address the issue thematically. This allows to bring together case studies from Europe (from North to South: Finland, Poland, Germany, Italy, Greece) and its margins (Turkey and Israel). We are aware, however, that our study is far from comprehensive given the number of cases of forced migrations recorded in history.

We assume that both politics of history and politics of the past which we understand in their practical dimension, i.e., from the perspective of legislative, executive and judicial decisions⁶⁴, have strongly evolved over time because of various constraints or opportunities: regime changes, European integration and the pressure of international standards (emergence of Human rights, focus on victims in post-conflict studies, European approach to international relations, and good neighbour policies).

⁶⁴ Edgar WOLFRUM, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, *op.cit.*

Assumptions and guidelines for a comparative approach

We have identified three main constraints or opportunities whose impact should be evaluated in order to address the issue of forced migrations, lost territories and politics of history:

(1) European integration: this is a political project which, since its initiation, has sought to reconcile the people of Europe, overcome the poison of nationalism responsible for two disastrous wars in Europe, and, last but not least, promote a common European identity. The process of strengthening European identity is closely connected to the recognition and building of a shared memory (see the projects of European museums or the European heritage label).⁶⁵ In this context, the memory of population transfer, although still barely addressed at the European level, represents a common base on which a common identity may be developed. Since its origins, the European integration has also been based on the principle of the intangibility of borders and on the idea of overcoming these borders. Through a process of increasingly deeper exchanges of goods, people and ideas, borders have now become areas of exchange and they are no longer perceived as frontlines within the European Union. Within a few decades, Europeans have developed an international relations approach that promotes trans-border cooperation and the establishment of good neighbourhood relations with a special focus on the protection of minorities across borders. This approach has had an impact on how the question of forced migrations associated with loss of territories has been dealt within Europe.

(2) An evolution in historiographical practices: After the Second World War, western countries broke with the promotion of national narratives based on heroic myths which were specific to the XIXth century and to the first half of the XXth century in Europe.⁶⁶ This approach was then characterized by an apologetic vision of the nation. Narratives of the past were likely to fuel warmongering or revisionist ambitions in the same way as history directly or indirectly

⁶⁵ Etienne FRANÇOIS, Kornelia KOŃCZAL, Robert TRABA, Stefan TROEBST (ed.) *Geschichtspolitik in Europa seit 1989, Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen im internationalen Vergleich*, Göttingen, Wallsteinverlag, 2013; Aleida ASSMANN, "Europe: A Community of Memory?", *Twentieth Annual Lecture of the GHI*, November 16, 2006; from the same author, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gedächtniskultur?*, Wien, Picus Verlag, 2012; Valérie ROSOUX, "Mémoire(s) européenne(s)? Forces et limites de l'intervention politique dans la mise en scène de l'histoire", *Politique et sociétés*, vol. 22, n°2, 2003, pp. 17-34; Oriane CALLIGARO, François FORET "La mémoire européenne en action", *Politique européenne*, n° 37, 2012, pp. 18-43.

⁶⁶ Gérard NOIRIEL, *Sur la "crise" de l'histoire*, Paris, Gallimard, 2005.

endorsed nationalist ideologies. Many aspects of national grand narratives have been criticized because of their disregard for regional particularities, their minimization of social tensions, and also for only presenting the winners' point of view. Progressively – and notably since the end of the Cold War⁶⁷ – an important fragmentation occurred with the emergence of previously silenced pages of history often linked to victims' memories. The growing publicization of counter-histories as well as the breaking up of post-war myths promoted a renewed interest in memory studies challenging the vision carried by official narratives often presenting their own people as 'victims.'⁶⁸ A new culture of memory has developed based on a 'duty to remember'. For the first time in centuries, one began to commemorate and deplore not only his / her own victims but also 'the victims of ones own crimes'.⁶⁹

(3) Largely linked to point two above, the emergence of the figure of the victim as a central figure of the policies of the past. Linked to the memory-boom which started in the late 1970s in Western Europe, new attention has been paid to the victims, making it morally difficult, if not impossible, to promote what was for long considered as the best guarantee for lasting peace: "prescriptive forgetting"⁷⁰ or silence. This approach of pacification goes back to Ancient Greece.⁷¹ Today, in opposition to this practice, long advocated in Europe (see France after World War II or Spain in the 1970s), a 'duty of remembrance' increasingly appears as the new norm in dealing with the past. A significant consequence of how the memory of the Holocaust has been built in the West, this approach is, among other things, presented as a moral duty towards the victims. The duty of remembrance is now accompanied by a right for victims to be heard, to have their own narrative and therefore to participate in the writing of history⁷². This evolution has led to a multi-perspective approach of historical narrative which has become increasingly fragmented and has lost its inclusive dimension (a great national unifying narrative) as well as its faculty of historically situating facts and events.⁷³ It is thus important to at least analyze the interactions between the different actors and their productions.

⁶⁷ Tony JUDT, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe", *Daedalus*, vol. 1, n° 4, fall 1991.

⁶⁸ Heidemarie UHL, "Vom Nachkriegsmythos zur Ethik der Erinnerung. Transformationen der Erinnerungskultur in Europa von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart", *Revue d'Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande*, vol. 44, n° 2, 2012, p. 191.

⁶⁹ Aleida ASSMANN, *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur. Eine Intervention*, Munich, C.H. Beck, 2013.

⁷⁰ Paul CONNERTON, "Seven Types of Forgetting", *Memory Studies*, 1, 2008, pp. 59–71.

⁷¹ Christian MEIER, *Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit*, Munich, Siedler Verlag, 2010.

⁷² Sandrine LEFRANC, Lilian MATHIEU, Johanna SIMÉANT, "Les victimes écrivent leur histoire", *op.cit.*, p. 6.

⁷³ Tony JUDT, "Introduction", *Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*, The Penguin Press New-York. 2008.

The different contributions in this book all examine the interactions between actors (social groups, state-institutions, political parties, interest groups, media) engaged in the politics of history and politics of the past, their motivations, their resources in different European countries and the public they seek to address. They examine the ideological as well as political, scientific and social contexts in which these actors evolve. They also assess how these politics evolve when new norms develop over the course of time.

