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**Olivier Esteves, introduction to *The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell : The Undying Political Animal* (Abingdon : Routledge, 2019)**

Blue plaques are unmistakable symbols of the U.K.'s landscapes. In London for instance, their function has mostly been to produce a celebratory consensus around the rich historical heritage and cultural vibrancy of the country's capital, from Mozart and Handel to Jimi Hendrix, from Gandhi to Churchill, from Virginia Woolf to George Orwell. Across the Irish sea, 88 of them are known to bedeck the city of Belfast walls, from Rory Gallagher to Van Morrison, from the ill-fated designer of the Titanic to poets Philip Larkin and Louis MacNeice. And in Scotland, Andrew Carnegie and Adam Smith have each their plaque in quaint Kirkcaldy some 30 miles north of Edinburgh. These are predominantly names of figures who have made history, but countless plaques in the country commemorate people of more obscure renown. In Wolverhampton alone, some forty of them were erected from 1983 to 2005.

**Reigniting controversy**

Blue plaques have mostly been serving as props to what Michael Billig has termed "banal nationalism". Much like the unwaved, barely noticeable flags on public buildings, their purpose is nevertheless "to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced" (Billig 1995, p. 6). They are small, interlocking loci which have sustained Britain's imagined community.

Although the immense majority of those plaques are innocuous and remain barely noticed by passers-by, there are times when the memories of a history foaming with much rage are sparked back into controversy. The January 2018 suggestion that Enoch Powell ought to get a blue plaque in Wolverhampton is unmistakably one such time. Hailed as a common-sense idea by the substantial portion of public opinion who, like in the 1980s and 2000s, have always believed that "Enoch was right", the prospect has unsurprisingly met with fierce resistance from the anti-racist left and beyond. Much of the controversy revolves around the

public function of such plaques: are they just about people (Powell) or can they be about events (the Birmingham speech of April 20<sup>th</sup> 1968, commonly known as ‘Rivers of blood’ speech)? Are they meant to celebrate or to commemorate? Can these plaques possibly do both simultaneously for different Britons with clashing views on the *enfant terrible* of the British right?

The commemorative / celebratory binary at the heart of the blue plaque polemic is a memorial straightjacket urging Britons to remember Powell as either a hero or villain, and then take the risk of being dismissed either as a ‘racist’ by some or a ‘liberal do-gooder’ by others. It almost seems that there is no way out of this racist / non-racist (or anti-racist) aporia, unless one takes a few steps back and starts asking some of the questions we have endeavoured to ask in this book. In itself this dichotomy is reflected by political, media and scholarly lexicon. Notice, for instance, how the phrase “rivers of blood speech”, fraught with a sense of looming crisis, has imposed itself or been imposed with barely any possibility to refer to this rhetorical act as anything else, really. In a way, the phrase partakes of the “hero vs. villain” dichotomy : for the Powellites, it encapsulates the necessity to do something now before actual blood is shed, whereas for the anti-Powellites, it highlights how ludicrously pessimistic the populist’s forecast was, in a country which today has some of the highest proportions of mixed-marriages in Western nations. In order to remove some of this sound and fury around Powell, we have collectively decided to drop the phrase “rivers of blood” speech to refer instead to the “Birmingham speech”, the “1968 speech”, “Powell’s speech” (since it towers above all else in the man’s career). “Rivers of blood” was media-fabricated, and has all too often lived a most bizarre life of its own, not to mention the (also ludicrous) fact that in the speech, there was originally *one* river only, the river Tiber.

But to come back to the plaque polemic. Would it not be more appropriate, if one were to be erected at all, to have it on the Midland Hotel façade from which Powell delivered his speech, which is today known as the Macdonald Burlington Hotel in New Street? Although hardly possible because the owners would not want it, this would at least single out a populist, opportunistic rhetorical exercise by a maverick, albeit intellectually brilliant politician. Instead of seemingly paying tribute to an individual career, a plaque on the Birmingham hotel would commemorate an act of discourse which the anti-racist left, ethnic minorities

themselves and radical right whites probably all regard as one of the most important speeches in contemporary British history.

Another option is possible. As Justin Gest's 2015 ethnographic fieldwork in Barking & Dagenham (East London) has shown, mainstream voters have a very keen sense that those they elected in the Commons often do not live in the areas they represent, a fact made possible by quite unrestrictive British election laws in this respect and which is all the more keenly felt in London constituencies, i. e. in places not far away from Westminster, where it is possible for M.Ps *not* to have two homes (Gest 2016, p. 199).

Enoch Powell was all too aware of this. In a *Daily Telegraph* piece which foreshadowed his Birmingham speech, he likened the New Commonwealth influx of immigrants to a new invasion suffered by those who had survived the Luftwaffe two decades earlier, before claiming that he was painfully cognizant of this situation as one who "live[d] within the proverbial stone's throw of a street which 'went black' " (*The Daily Telegraph*, 16. 02. 1967). The truth, however, was slightly more complex than that. For one thing, Powell never aimed at remaining a Wolverhampton M.P. for 24 years (1950-1974). Although, as **Nick Jones** highlights in his chapter, Powell did relish spending a great deal of time in his constituency home on week-ends and on long parliamentary recesses, it still remains that for much of the week his abode was not near a street which 'went black' in the Black Country, but rather in upmarket South Eaton Place in the heart of Belgravia (London). It is also worth remembering that the very man who fallaciously claimed that one school in Wolverhampton had a nearly all-black class actually sent his two daughters to a central London school, before they went to fee-paying Wycombe Abbey, where black girls, if there were any, were more likely to have been daughters of African ambassadors.

Back in 1968-9, many demonstrators against Powell made no mistake about his abode: a few communist militants put up a large swastika banner in front of the Belgravia house, and anti-racist protest letters were directly sent to this house (*The Guardian*, 09. 12. 1968). The tension caused some concern among neighbours. This was particularly the case of one life-long Labour militant, Anne Symonds, who lived on 30 Eaton Place, after Penguin Press, in

Paul Foot's *The Rise of Enoch Powell*, had wrongly published Powell's address as 30, instead of 33, South Eaton Place. Irritated by the publisher's gaffe, she stated that quite apart from "the thought that I live with Enoch Powell [...] I don't want a brick through my window" (*The Guardian*, 20.09.1969). Powell lived in that house until his death in 1998. A few yards from a blue plaque with internationally successful playwright and composer "Noel Coward lived here" written upon it, it was sold by Powell's widow that same year. Eleven years later, in the wake of the credit crunch, the house was again on sale for 3.65 million pounds. As for the Wolverhampton house, the Powells sold it in 1975, after the populist right-winger had become elected Unionist M.P. for South Down (Northern Ireland). Pamela Powell recalls, painstakingly avoiding the received wisdom that the immigrant presence brought house prices down: "We bought our house in 1954 for £1,300 – semi-detached, five bedrooms, very cold as you remember, didn't have a telephone – and we sold it in 1975, using a different name, and got exactly the same money we paid for it after twenty-one years because all around had so greatly changed" (*The Times*, 22. 02. 2009). Occurring each after two major economic crises (1973, 2008), the sale of the two houses still illuminates the way the two Powell abodes were almost on two different English planets.

Despite the almost metronomic conjuring of Powell's ghost, which writer Sarfraz Manzoor has likened to a "toxic cloud above all political debate on race relations" (*The Guardian*, 24. 02. 2008), several ironies clearly indicate that as this book goes to press both people and buildings have simply moved on. These ironies make the building of a plaque unfeasible for pragmatic reasons. For many years, a West-Indian family -the Walkers- lived in the very same house as the Powells, on Merridale Road. The family was anxious to avoid any recognition of their home, particularly by the news media. Another irony is that Powell's former parliamentary office has now been transformed into a West-Indian heritage centre, a change that Labour M.P. Eleanor Smith interprets as "poetic justice" (*Channel Four*, 31. 10. 2017). Last but not least, this M.P. for South West Wolverhampton, exactly Powell's turf, is the first West-Indian M.P. to have ever been elected in the West Midlands as a whole.

**No Iago, no Churchill**

These reminders are not anecdotal. They underline the complex interconnections between the micro- (Wolverhampton and its various neighbourhoods), the meso- (West Midlands), the macro- (Britain, or rather England) and super-macro (the former British Empire in Powellite discourse on immigration, The United States as a racial foil in Powellite discourse, not to mention Europe and the Common Market) levels that must be appraised when studying a figure with such proclaimed local rootedness as well as such national resonance overnight. For the social scientist, these layers of meanings are both centripetal (the neighbourhood is a powerful symbolical axis, whether seen as a terrain to be defended against racist forces or as a threatened space encroached upon by immigrants) and centrifugal : the defiled letter-box mentioned by Powell, like a stone thrown in a pond radiating out in ripples, has something to say about the Keynesian-Fordist Welfare State, about British national identity, about post-colonial visions of orderliness (after Mary Douglas's anthropology of dirt as a symbolic "matter out of place") (Douglas 1966), and about British (or rather English) fears of American-style black ghettos.

Another example of this interconnectedness is similarly instructive : the January 1969 "March for Dignity"<sup>1</sup> held by the "Black People's Alliance" and the "Zimbabwe solidarity action committee" exposed two enemies, one at home ("Racialism"<sup>2</sup>), one abroad ("Imperialism") (Bourne 1998), but it was abundantly clear from the video footage and the slogans shouted to the 8 000-strong crowd that Enoch Powell in Wolverhampton and Ian Smith in Rhodesia were two sides of the same ugly coin. The struggle, then, could not but be multi-scalar, as individuals carrying "Disembowel Powell" or "Black Power: Fire This Time" took on Rhodesia House and South-Africa House before being thwarted by the police forces.<sup>3</sup>

This multi-scalar interconnectedness, added to the way in which Powell has been mythified into a villain or hero, means that one of the challenges facing future research is to reterritorialise Powell, by firmly placing him back into specific territorialities, the most obvious of which being Wolverhampton itself (Hirsch, 2018). These territorialities may be geographical, political, symbolical, professional, ethnic, associational, or even emotional

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1 I have found alternatively 'March For Dignity' and 'March of Dignity'.

2 "Racialism" was nearly always used in the 1960s, and "racism" was not, at least in Britain.

3 For video archives, check : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3SYNo2t6nXg> (accessed 06. 04. 2018).

(Goodwin, Jasper, Polletta, 2001). In the pages that follow, **Brett Bebber** analyses the foundation of the Runnymede Trust in May 1968 as an immediate political response to Powell's speech. **Nick Jones** investigates the way Powell's instrumentalization of the media through his contact with his own father, Clement Jones, was an early stage in the weaving of a powerful connection between two discrete professional fields, 16 years before the phrase "spin-doctor" appears to have been coined.<sup>4</sup> **Kevin Myers** devotes his chapter to Birmingham classroom and school practises in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the way teacher agency and classroom innovations tried to resist what they saw as the menace of Powellism. **David Shiels** illuminates the way Powellite discourses on immigration harnessed the Irish question.

One other way of reterritorializing Powell is to research, for different political actors and at different times, his lasting influence on debates on immigration, race, nation and multiculturalism. This lasting influence can hardly be exaggerated. Some of it is perfunctorily rhetorical. It ranges from the all-too-obvious, as in Boris Johnson's 2002 claim that "the Queen has come to love the Commonwealth, partly because it supplies her with regular cheering crowds of flag-waving piccaninnies" (*The Daily Telegraph*, 10. 01. 2002), the last word being an obvious echo of Powell's "charming, wide-eyes piccaninnies" harassing this frightened widow, to the not-so-obvious but clearly there, as in David Barnett's praise of the 2016 book *The Good Immigrant*: "If I could, I'd push a copy of this through the letter-box of every front door in Britain" (*The Independent*, 06. 10. 2016). Most of this influence, though, is programmatic and ideological and needs to be reterritorialized into specific decades, if only to challenge the ahistorical, disembodied "Enoch was Right" or its symmetrical contrary vilifying Powell as a timeless, Iago-like villain (Schofield 2009, p. 10).

To launch this analysis, **Robert Ford** reappraises the centrality of immigration and race in electoral behaviour from shortly before Powell's moment (1964) to the advent of Thatcherism in 1979. Then, **Stéphane Porion** analyses the Powell effect on the National Front in the 1970s, which desperately needed "charismatic leadership", and explains why

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<sup>4</sup> It is often claimed that the first occurrence of the phrase was with *The New York Times* (21. 10. 1984), on the Mondale / Reagan televised debates.

Powell never was one of them. In another chapter, the same author studies the way Alfred Sherman- who was one of the pivotal architects in the advent of Thatcherism- was, to a large extent, a champion of Powellism, but on the European question. As for **Karine Tournier-Sol**, she studies the interconnectedness between Powellism and the U.K.I.P. in more recent years. **Paul Corthorn** aims at re-evaluating Powell from the standpoint of a broader declinist discourse, taking into account not only race and immigration, which is what this book is primarily about, but also the disintegration of the British Empire, Europe, international relations and the economy. This he does by drawing a comparison between the political itineraries of Powell and Julian Amery.

### **Populism, nativism, autochthony**

A shallow definition of “populism” of the kind we have been fed for more than a decade,<sup>5</sup> could be that “populism” is when “politicians tell the people what they want to hear”. Powell’s rhetoric, rather than his style, peerlessly matches this definition. Indeed, in some of the most notorious cases, he impersonated a political ventriloquist mechanically quoting the epistolary grievances bestowed upon him. Although evident, that point is often lost in the presentations or analyses made of the Birmingham speech. From documentaries (*White Season*, BBC, 2008) to essays about race (Reni Eddo-Lodge’s *Why I’m No Longer Talking To White People About Race* (Eddo-Lodge 2017, p. 117), and notwithstanding the sheer political contrast between these, the infamous claim that “in this country in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man” is often mistakenly quoted as being by Powell himself, and not by some unnamed constituent that Powell quoted in a performative rhetorical gimmick. Some letters of support to Powell corroborate this sense of confusion over “who speaks”. For instance, a woman from Colchester (Essex) vehemently agreed with the populist’s tragically declinist oracle: “the immigrants will, as you said, soon have the whip hand” (Stafford, D3123 / 14). As Bill Schwarz has underlined, thanks to such quotes of constituents and to other rhetorical devices, “an inchoate jumble of racial bigotry crossed the threshold from private reverie to public wisdom” (Schwarz 2011, p. 19). Just as disturbingly, Powell’s discourse and the fears and resentments he voiced (rather than his high-flown style, his quoting of Virgil, etc.) tend to invalidate classical distinctions between top-down and bottom-up approaches. And accordingly, a study of Powell’s populist politics should include

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<sup>5</sup> In 2004, Cas Mudde was already referring to the “contemporary populist *Zeitgeist*” (p. 31).



an “ethnography of populism”, whose contours are here delineated by Dutch sociologist Paul Mepschen: “By focusing the ethnographic lens on everyday perspectives and behavior, the emphasis in the social analysis of populism shifts from electoral politics and political discourse only, to processes of articulation, interpellation, and to agency” (Mepschen 2016, pp. 64 & 71). These everyday perspectives and behaviors weigh on electoral behaviour, as is analyzed here by **Robert Ford**. In another perspective, they also weave their way into the epistolary expression of resentful autochthony analysed in one of **Olivier Esteves**’s chapters, through letters of support to Powell which frequently harness memories of the second world war, in order to express their hostility to immigrants who are regarded as “space invaders”. As Sara Farris puts it in her study of what she calls ‘femonationalism’, i. e. the instrumentalization of women’s rights by the far-right, “the people that is called upon to act against the Other is not [...] a shapeless demos, but a specific ethnos or natio” (p. 60). It was (also) as a bounded, ethnicized, beleaguered and insular *ethnos* that the Powellites apprehended their identity, through tropes of autochthony, such as “displacement, nostalgia, and respectability” (Mepschen 2016, p. 48).

Many perceptions, themes and feelings permeating the letters of support to Powell cohere with ethnographies of populism in other countries and at other periods. Indeed, much of the contents in these 1968 letters allows many parallels with Michele Lamont’s study of the American and French working-classes in the 1990s, Justin Gest’s study of Barking and Dagenham as well as Youngstown (Ohio) in the 2010s, not to mention, indeed, Paul Mepschen’s analysis of the ‘New West’ neighbourhood of Amsterdam in the years 2009-2011 (Lamont 2000, Gest 2016, Mepschen 2016). What all this reveals is that the Powell moment of 1968 should be seen as a pivotal political precursor to the upsurge of radical right-wing politics at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Like the chaos unleashed at the time of the Democratic convention in August 1968 in Chicago, Powell’s detonation is an often forgotten episode of 1968, lost in celebrations of a (left-wing) revolutionary year from Paris to Mexico City, from Prague to Belfast, from Rome to Tokyo. Both Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley’s moment in August 1968 and Powell’s a few months before adumbrate the Western revolt on the right, by a (white) “silent majority” striking out against radical students, immigrants, left-wingers, undeserving “freeloaders”, etc. In this sense, there is a real need to further “deparochialize” the figure of Powell, i. e. to analyze his rhetoric, his politics and his following from a broader international perspective. Another chapter from this book, by **Olivier Esteves**, is an international press view of articles dealing with Powell, mostly from the European and U.S.

press. Although quite modest in itself, this deparochializing effort serves as a complementing counterpoint to the reterritorializing effort mentioned above: instead of narrowing the focus on Powell to specific domains in British politics or society, the idea is rather, here, to broaden the perspective on a figure whose analysis is too often limited to English / British confines.

If we now place the focus on populism as electoral politics more traditionally understood, much academic research published since the mid-2000s likewise serve to highlight key components of Powell's politics itself. Among the plethora of books and articles published on the catch-all concept of populism, it is possible to identify nine specific traits which help to make sense of Powell's ideology, career, as well as of the responses he brought about and the party reactions his campaign generated. These elements are mostly drawn from the works of political scientists or sociologists, such as Barr, Kaltwasser, Lucardie, Moffit, Mudde and Taggart, all of whom deal primarily with European, North- or South-American populisms. These nine points are bound up with nativism and autochthony, be it directly or indirectly.

To begin with, Mudde and Kaltwasser suggest the following minimal definition of populism, which is an apt starting point:

Populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* of the people. This means that populism is in essence a form of *moral* politics, as the distinction between 'the elite' and 'the people' is first and foremost moral (i. e. pure *vs* corrupt), not situational (e.g. position of power), socio-cultural (e.g. ethnicity, religion), or socio-economic (e.g. class) (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012, pp. 7-8).

In terms of populism as a political style, two features identified by Moffit help to make sense of Powell. First, "populist leaders must strike a balance between appearing as both ordinary and extraordinary to appeal to 'the people'. In doing so, they must ostensibly be 'of the people' *as well as* simultaneously beyond 'the people' " (Moffit 2016, p. 52). The Birmingham speech is a perfect illustration of this two-sided strategy : by quoting both from Virgil's *Aeneid* (after some dithering about whether he should quote him in English or Latin) as well as from resentful constituents themselves, Powell firmly set his place both way

beyond the people and well as profoundly *of* them. Secondly, Moffit positions populist leaders as being characterized by “bad manners”, which to him do not necessarily mean having a vulgar accent, or speaking or behaving in a specifically uncouth or coarse way (Moffit 2016, p. 45). Some populist leaders have sometimes seemed aloof or snobbish (Geert Wilders, Ross Perrot), at a remove from, say, George Wallace’s self-proclaimed (and genuine) fondness for ketchup at every meal. Yet they have committed breaches of protocol for strategic purposes, and such was so blatantly the case for Powell. It is well-known that immediately prior to the Birmingham speech, he deliberately refrained from revealing the contents of his speech to Edward Heath’s shadow cabinet (Schofield 2013, p. 209). More importantly, what was a shocking about the speech was not so much what he said in it rather than *how* it was said. As Schofield pointed out, “Powell had violated the central premise of the political consensus –the rule of polite opinion” (*Ibid.*, p. 238). How strategic the violation of polite, elite-friendly norms of behaviour was is highlighted within the speech itself, where Powell famously warned: “I can already hear the chorus of execration...How dare I say such a horrible thing?”, in a rhetorical ploy which cunningly combined Weberian ethics of conviction with ethics of responsibility.

Three partisan elements follow from these style-related features. First, many populists, as Mudde and Lucardie have argued, present themselves as party purifiers intent upon restoring the original ideology of a party (believed to have been diluted or betrayed by the current leaders) rather than as actual ‘prophets’ who articulate a thoroughly new ideology for new times (Mudde 2016, p. 10 ; Lucardie 2000, pp. 176-7). This, clearly, is also the case for Powell. Once he realized, in 1974, that the Conservative party could not be “purified” according to his terms, he crossed the Irish Sea and became an Ulster Unionist Party M.P. The second point is that whilst he was still a member of the Conservative party, he nurtured a self-image of keeping at the margins of the political game despite keeping his parliamentary seat in Wolverhampton. As Mudde says in general terms, “Populist radical right parties prefer to keep ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of government, meaning that they prefer to keep their *oppositional image*, by using radical rhetoric and pushing for excessively radical policies, rather than run the risk of being perceived as ‘normal’ governmental party and part of the ‘corrupt elite’ ” (Mudde 2016, p. 16). Thirdly, the way the Conservative party dealt with Powell’s populist threat within its ranks is also evocative of political party reactions *vis-à-vis* populists in general. These are classically of four types: “isolation, confrontation, adaptation and socialization” (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012, p. 213). Heath’s party in 1968 and in the years

that followed opted both for “isolation” as well as “adaptation”: the former was illustrated by his swift exclusion from Heath’s shadow cabinet, which had built a *cordon sanitaire* around Powell. It is worth recalling here that the man literally became *persona non grata*, and was ostracised within the party he had spent his life working for. Mudde and Kaltwasser posit that the isolation strategy is in itself a mirror image of the populist language, since “it assumes that the political world should be seen as a moral battle, which is (almost) impossible to solve through democratic channels”. “Adaptation” to Powell was clearly illustrated by the way the 1970 Conservative party platform did include some points on immigrants’ repatriation. More broadly speaking, the recurrent come back of Powell’s ghost in debate on race and immigration testifies to a myriad cross-party “adaptations” through decades, and it is some of these adaptations and reconfigurings which are analyzed in the pages that follow, notably by **Robert Ford, Stéphane Porion and Karine Tournier-Sol.**

Three points remain to be made, one on the perceived failure of democratic rule, one on cross-class alliances, the last one on “nativism” itself.

The sense of emergency and crisis populists exploit is intensified by what is seen as the betrayal, political naivety or cosmopolitanism of the elites, which seems to rig the democratic process itself. It is no coincidence that constituents, in their letters of support to Powell, very often use words like “referendum” or (less often) “plebiscite”: the idea is that had they been consulted as behooves a full-fledged democracy, they would have refused both the concept of a multi-racial Britain and the Race Relations Bill itself, a feeling which is borne out by polling evidence. This frustration, which in the present case is also experienced as a menace to the essence of (freedom-based) Britishness, is in line with the populist “belief that the *volonté générale* should be implemented without any restrictions. Nothing is more important than the general will of the people” (Mudde 2007, p. 151). It is no coincidence either that Powell himself was one of the first senior British politicians to push for greater use of referendums.

Nativism, the need for direct democracy in the form of referenda, and the sense of betrayal by the elites all facilitate cross-class alliances, which is often what populist leaders strive for (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012, p. 5). The mythified ethnos that native Britons are summoned to identify with at the exclusion of New Commonwealth immigrants is made up of a portion of the working-class and of many middle-class folks. It is noteworthy that media

coverage emphasized, not only in Britain, the Powellite alignment of dockers, meat-porters, etc. Whilst it is itself debatable how many dockers actually sided with Powell (Lindop, 2001), it does remain that the core of Powell supporters did not take noisily to the streets and was made up of suburban middle-classes, as is testified by the large number of support letters sent from Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Devon, etc. This is precisely how, in Powell's case, the hazy notion of "silent majority" should be understood.

One last point. Rather than engage in debates on what kind of "right" Powell was identified with (either "far", "extreme" or "radical"), it seems important to associate his rhetoric and ideology to "nativism", which is a "key feature of the populist right" according to Mudde, and "an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the nation state's homogeneity" (Mudde 2016, p. 6). As Duyvendak and Kesic underline, although a more appropriate concept than mere "nationalism" to make sense of the contemporary upsurge of populist parties in Europe, the concept happens to be very rarely deployed (Duyvendak & Kesic, 2018). As we have said above, it may be argued that Powell's rocket-like career served as a (British) prologue to this contemporary upsurge, and that it was nativist at its core.

Nativism is commonly used to study the United States, say, from the period of reconstruction to the end of the First World War. In his foundational work, John Higham defines nativism as "intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e. "un-American") connections." (Higham, 2011, 4). Higham distinguishes three types of nativism: religious nativism (Catholics as a threat to the W.A.S.P model), political nativism (the Red Scare), and racial nativism (100% Americans vs. presumably inferior though threatening races, i. e. all non W.A.S.Ps). From this triad, Duyvendak and Kesic have wrought another one, adapted to the Netherlands and more broadly to contemporary Europe: religious nativism (in the form of Islamophobia, although they do not use the word itself), class nativism (elites as a threat to the nation), and racial nativism (immigrants and ethnic minorities lumped together as occupying too much space, literally, politically and symbolically). Elements two and three of this triad are very germane to apprehend Powell and his following, whereas the first one (religious nativism) is only minor: at a time when Islam as

such was outside political debate in Britain and Britons had never heard of “hijabs”, “fatwas” and “jihad” (Esteves 2011), it was Sikh customs and militancy which were construed as a threat, particularly in the West Midlands and Southall. This is true despite the very obvious fact that anti-Sikh feelings and discourses in the 1960s pale into insignificance when compared with current polemics about Islam, many of which have been conditioned by foreign policy issues.

Three tropes connected with nativism are central to Powellite discourses and perceptions. One is home politics, a rudimentary, 1960s form of what William Walters would label “domopolitics” in the post 9/11 securitization of Western societies (Walters 2004), with homes being seen as under constant siege. A second one is (race-based) rootedness naturalizing national belonging and suggesting a culturalization of citizenship which in turn legitimizes welfare chauvinism discourses. That rootedness, after Pierre Bourdieu, needs to be questioned (Bourdieu 1999, p. 142-3). Thirdly, the centrality of nostalgia. Duyvendak talks about a “revanchist nostalgia” which is prevalent in Western Europe today. Again, it may be argued that Powell set the tone for much of this in Britain. In this neighbourhood-centred nostalgia, “*spatial* transformations have largely been interpreted as *temporal* developments” (Duyvendak 2011, p. 108). To put it differently, in Powellite perceptions the hackneyed phrase “there goes the neighbourhood!” is very often race-based coded language. It is often based on a notion of territorial rights, along the lines of “we were here first”, which itself gives the natives the right to prescribe to immigrants how they must behave (*Ibid.*, 110). In all of this, and as hopefully we have managed to demonstrate in this book, top-down discourses and bottom-up indignant feelings are remarkably in sync. In all of this, Powell’s 1968 episode also set the tone for much of the British debate on race and immigration, and adumbrated some of the European contemporary waves of nativist populism. It is highly ironic that a post-Brexit book about a quintessentially English figure might serve to illuminate, if indirectly, some current political debates in Europe.

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